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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE POLICY AND WPITIEN
WITNESSES' STATEMENTS HELD DISCOVERABLE
Plaintiff sued to recover damages for injuries received while a
passenger in defendant's automobile. Upon plaintiff's motion under
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 34, the trial court allowed discovery of
defendant's automobile liability insurance policy, and of witnesses'
written statements obtained by defendant's counsel, including any
written statements of the defendant and plaintiff. On appeal,2 the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. Held: Under Alaska'Rule of Civil
Procedure 34, a plaintiff is entitled to discovery of defendant's insurance
policy and any written statements of witnesses which were obtained by
defendant's counsel. Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1964).
Decisions interpreting language similar to that of Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)3 and 34 have generally held that insurance con-
tracts are not relevant to the "subject matter of the pending action."'
Most federal district courts have denied discovery,5 but no federal court
of appeals has yet been presented with the question. The state courts,
while formerly split on the issue, have tended recently towards denial
of discovery.6 Many state and federal courts have stated that insurance
1'Discovery and Production of Documents and Things for Inspection, Copying, or
Photographing. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor .... the court
in which the action is pending may-
(1) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photograph-
ing. .. of any designated documents .... which constitute or contain evidence relating
to any of the subject matter within the scope of examination permitted by Rule
26(b)... ." Alaska Rule 34 is identical to FED. R. CIv. P. 34 and WAsH. R. Crv. P. 34.
2 Plaintiff did not appear nor submit a brief on defendant's appeal of the ruling.
3 ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 26(b). "Scope of Examination. ... The deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examin-
ing party or to the claim or defense of any other party.... ."
4 E.g., McNelley v. Perry, 18 FJ.RD. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) ; Brooks v. Owens,
97 So2d 693 (Fla. 1957).
G See Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962) ; McDaniel v. Mayle,
30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn.
1962) ; Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; Flynn v. Williams, 30
F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn. 1958); Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958);
Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Iil. 1958); McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D.
360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) ; McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Contra,
Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961) ; Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585
(S.D. N.Y. 1948).,
6 State decisions in which discovery has been denied are: Di Pietruntonio v. Superior
Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958) ; Verrastro v. Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp. 165,
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policies are not relevant, since discovery will not aid the purposes of
proving liability or damages,7 nor result in facts for use in a trial or as a
lead to information for use in a trial.
Following the formulation and adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it was not long before the question arose as to what extent
the rules permitted discovery of written statements of witnesses." An
amendment to the rules had been proposed to the United States Su-
preme Court,10 but it was never adopted, the Court instead attempting
to solve the controversy by a judicial decision. This was accomplished
in the case of Hickman v. Taylor," where the Court set down the limits
of discovery of attorney's work-product. However, since the Hickman
case, the controversy has continued as to the application of the dis-
covery rules to attorney's work-product, particularly in regards to
written statements obtained from witnesses.
In granting plaintiff's motion for discovery of defendant's insurance
policy, the Alaska court reasoned that discovery would help plaintiff
decide whether to litigate or settle, that such discovery would not confer
any advantage on the plaintiff in the actual trial of the issues, and that
insurance policies were relevant to the issues."
Discovery of witnesses' statements was allowed to eliminate surprise
at the trial, to preserve evidence, and thereby encourage settlement or
expeditious trial of the litigation. The court narrowed the attorney
work-product doctrine, by distinguishing the leading decision of Hick-
man v. Taylor, and stating that in the principal case, unlike Hickman,
the defendant's counsel had not been requested to reduce oral state-
ments of witnesses to writing. Plaintiff's failure to show good cause for
149 A.2d 703 (1958) ; Ruark v. Smith, 147 A.2d 514 (Del. 1959) ; Brooks v. Owens,
97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957) ; Jeppesen v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W2d 649 (1955) ;
State v. District Court, 142 Mont. 139, 381 P.2d 799 (1963) ; State ex rel. Allen v.
Second Judicial Dist., 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999 (1952); Goheen v. Goheen, 9 NJ.
Misc. 507, 154 At. 393 (1931) ; Peters v. Webb, 316 P2d 170 (Okla. 1957) ; Bean v.
Best, 76 S. D. 462, 80 N.W.2d 565 (1957). Contra, Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal.
App2d 391, 334 P2d 638 (1959) ; Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064
(1959) ; People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill.2d 231, 145 N.E2d 588 (1957) ; Maddox
v. Grauman, 265 S.W2d 939 (Ky. 1954) ; Layton v. Cregan & Mallory Co., 263 Mich.
30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933).
7 The argument has been advanced that insurance is just one resource of several that
defendant might have and if it may be discovered, all of his assets should be discover-
able. Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; State v. District Court, 142
Mont. 139, 381 P.2d 799 (1963).8 McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) ; Brooks v. Owens, 97 So2d
693 (Fla. 1957).
9 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRc'rics, 2623 [4], at 1339 (2d ed. 1963).
o 0Id. 2623 [6], at 1358.
11329 U.S. 495 (1947).
12 4 MooRE, FmmL PRAcICE, 2623[8], at 1381 (2d ed. 1963).
1 8 392 P2d at 22.
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discovery was excused by a statement that good cause was "so obvious"
that an extended formal showing was not necessary. The court denied
that such a broad discovery policy would result in an "unjust use of the
fruits of opposing counsel's labor" or discourage pre-trial research and
investigation.
DiscovERY OF INSURANCE PoLicrEs
In allowing discovery of insurance policies on the ground of en-
couraging settlement, the Alaska court went against the current devel-
opment of both federal and state case law,1 on a theory inapplicable
to the Alaska statutes. Many of the state decisions allowing discovery,
including People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher5 and Maddox v. Grauman,e
cited by the court, have granted disclosure on the theory that the
insurance contract inures to the benefit of the injured party.l This
theory has arisen from state motor vehicle financial responsibility
statutes" and court construction of insurance policies stating that the
injured person is a third party beneficiary of the insurance contract.
Alaska has no similar interpretation of its insurance statute'9 nor case
construction of insurance policies.
In granting discovery of insurance policies, the court failed to
consider the consequences of and arguments against excessive encour-
agement of pre-trial settlements. Discovery may often encourage,
rather than discourage, litigation, due to plaintiff's demands for settle-
ments at dollar amounts higher than would have been demanded had
discovery been denied.20 This presents an insurance company with the
dilemma of whether to take a chance with litigation or to make a higher
settlement than is considered reasonable. Possible results include more
4 In addition to the arguments subsequently stated in the text, several constitutional
questions have been raised under Rule 34: (1) To require the defendant to disclose the
amount of his insurance policy would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure;
(2) to require such disclosure would deprive him of his property without due process
of law; and (3) to require such disclosure would amount to a denial of equal protection
of the laws. Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal2d 749, 235 P2d 833 (1951) ;
Demaree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 99, 103, 73 P.2d 605, 607 (1937). The arguments
were rejected in both decisions. See Note, 34 NoTm DAmm LAw. 78, 83 (1958).
'512 Ill2d 231, 145 N.E2d 588 (1957).
16 265 S.W2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
37 E.g., Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951);
Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064 (1959); People ex rel. Terry v.
Fisher, 12 Ill2d 231, 145 N.E2d 588 (1957); Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W2d 939
(Ky. 1954).3 8E.g., ILL. Ray. STAT. 1955, ch. 73, § 1000.
'
0 ALIsxA STAr. 21.10.225.2
o E.g., Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; State v. District Court,
142 Mont. 139, 381 P2d 799 (1963). See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74
HtAv. L. Rxv. 940, 1018 (1961).
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litigation as insurance companies might be unwilling to give such set-
tlements, or the insurance companies might settle rather than risk the
the anticipated discovery and a resulting large claim. A sure conse-
quence of either result would be rate increases to the public, due to
costs of litigation or excessively high settlements. The purpose of
discovery procedures, obtaining evidence relevant to the subject matter,
may well become secondary to plaintiff's attempts to maneuver insur-
ance companies into settlements. Accident cases may become battles
of leverage, pressure, and maneuvering, rather than cooperative settle-
ment or supervised ligation.
DIscOvERY OF WITNESSES' WRITTEN STATEMENTS
The Alaska court broadened the discovery rules further by allowing
discovery of written witnesses' statements. In doing so, the court
distinguished Hickman v. Taylor,"' the leading work-product doctrine
case, on erroneous grounds. Hickman concerned the discovery of state-
ments made by survivors of a tug boat accident and obtained by counsel
for the tug owners. The moving party made no showing of necessity
or good cause for discovery. The Supreme Court held that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 33, and 34 do not allow discovery as of
right of oral and written statements of witnesses secured by counsel in
the course of preparation for litigation.2 Hickman was not limited to
discovery of oral statements which must be put in writing by an at-
torney, as the Alaska court supposed.
The Court in Hickman attempted to clear up the confusion surround-
ing various discovery rules, and it did so by using the work-product
doctrine as a means of placing certain documents beyond mere de-
mand." Before making use of discovery under Rule 34, other discovery
techniques must be used, and reasonable amounts of investigation
completed. Discovery of an attorney's work product under Rule 34
thus became the final method available for obtaining relevant evidence,
and then only by making the proper showing of good cause." The
position taken by the Alaska court, that good cause need not be shown,
is irreconcilable with decisions in the majority of other jurisdictions.
Most have adopted the Hickman rule, and will allow discovery of
witnesses' statements only after a showing of necessity and good cause.25
21 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
22 Id. at 508-10.
23 Id. at 513.
24 See 4 Moops, FEDERAL PRAcncE, f 2623[8], at 1381 (2d ed. 1963).2 5 Dean v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 104, 324 P2d 764 (1958) ; Dritt v. Morris,
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With the abandonment of the requirement of good cause, differences
no longer exist in the showing required under discovery rules 26,28 3327
and 34.28 Each rule was designed to serve a specific technique for the
discovery of evidence. Without the need for showing good cause,
however, it would seem that statements of witnesses in the hands of
counsel are freely discoverable under any of the above rules. This
broad discovery policy may eliminate surprise and make evidence more
convenient to obtain, but the-probable consequence will be that "much
of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten."29 Further,
counsel will endeavor to limit their records of witnesses' pre-trial
statements to notes of counsel's personal observations." Under Rule
34, as with all discovery rules, the interests of justice, as well as the
adequate trying of the issues, are better fulfilled by two attorneys
working independently in finding the evidence. A more complete find-
ing of the evidence will result, and the adversary system will then
operate at its fullest potential.'
The subject matter limits of discovery are no longer clear when the
barrier of necessity and good cause is discarded. Does the court by its
holding intend to grant discovery of the parties' statements which are
requested by plaintiff's counsel? Generally, out of fairness, courts have
granted discovery of any written statement of the plaintiff on a showing
of good cause' However, defendant's statements would clearly fall
within the attorney-client privilege and be immune from discovery.83 In
the broad language of this opinion it is not apparent whether either or
both are discoverable.
357 S.W2d 13 (Ark. 1962); Frank C. Sparks Co. v. Huber Baking Co., 114 A2d 657
(Del. 1955) ; Atlantic Coast Line I. Co. v. Allen, 40 So2d 115 (Fla. 1949) ; Setzers
Super Stores of Georgia Inc. v. Higgins, 104 Ga. App. 116, 121 S.E2d 305 (1961) ;
Self v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 90 So2d 547 (La. App. 1956); Brown v.
Saint Paul City Ry. Co., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W2d 688 (1954) ; Headrick v. Bailey, 365
Mo. 160, 278 S.W2d 737 (1955) ; Hollander v. Smith & Smith, 10 N.J. Super. 82, 76
A.2d 697 (1950); Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc.2d 757, 243 N.YS2d 715 (1963);
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952).
26 ALSx R. Civ. P. 26. Depositions Pending Action.
2 7 ALAsy R. Crv. P. 33. Interrogatories to Parties.
2 8 ALAS. R. Cirv. P. 34. See note 1 supra.
29 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).30 Notes of counsel's personal observations, impressions, conclusions, and opinions
have generally been non-discoverable. E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516
(1947) ; Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.1LD. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Dean v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 104, 108, 324 P2d 764, 768 (1958).31 Developtumts in the Laz-Discovery, 74 HAv. L. REv. 940, 1033 (1961).
32 E.g., Taylor v. Central R.R. C, 21 F.R.D. 112 (S.D. N.Y 1957) ; Shupe v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co., 19 F.R.D. 144 (WD. Pa. 1956).33 E.g., People v. Ryan, 40 Ill. App.2d 352, 189 N.E,2d 763 (1963); Cranston v.
Stewart, 184 Kan. 99, 334 P.2d 337 (1959) ; State ex rel. Terminal R. Ass'n v. Flynn.
363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W2d 69 (1953).
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION NOT IMPLIED
BY PENDENT JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs' suit against a securities underwriter, and several individ-
uals alleged to be associated with and to control the underwriter, was
commenced in the Federal District Court of Colorado. Damages were
claimed for alleged violations of both Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19341 and the Kansas Blue Sky Laws. Defendant in
the principal case was a third-party defendant to the action and was
personally served in Kansas pursuant to section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act,2 which provides for extra-territorial services of process.
Defendant conceded that the court had personal jurisdiction over him
with respect to the federal claims, but moved for dismissal of the state
claims on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. The
court granted defendant's motion.' Held: Extraterritorial personal
service upon a defendant pursuant to section 27 of the Securities Ex-
change Act does not give a federal district court personal jurisdiction
over the defendant with respect to pendent state claims if service upon
the defendant would have been insufficient had the pendent state claims
been brought separately in the forum state. Trussell v. United Under-
writers, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964).
The judicially-created doctrine of "pendent jurisdiction" has usually
been attributed to Hurn v. Oursler.' In Hum, the Supreme Court held
that a federal district court with jurisdiction over federal claims may
exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter of claims based upon state
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (1963),
provides that "any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chap-
ter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter
or rules and regulations, may be brought in any.., district or in the district wherein the
defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process ... may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the
defendant may be found...."
s Ibis is the third reported decision on the pleadings arising out of claims alleged in
this and related cases. See Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 230 F. Supp. 136 (D.
Colo. 1964); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
4289 U.S. 238 (1933). The doctrine had its roots in earlier cases, however. See gen-
erally, Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 62 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1018 (1962).
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law which arise out of the same or substantially the same facts. Since
Hum, conflict has arisen as to whether personal jurisdiction with re-
spect to pendent state claims may be implied from subject matter
jurisdiction.' A majority of courts have reached the same result as did
the court in the principal case.
The court in the principal case recognized that Congress is probably
empowered to provide for extra-territorial service of process with
respect to pendent state claims, but observed that Congress had not
expressly done so in section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act or by
Rule. Noting that the "explicit limits of service of process historically
have been meticulously guarded,"8 the court concluded that section
27 should not be extended by implication to give the court personal
jurisdiction over defendant with respect to pendent state claims. More-
over, the court reasoned that it continued to be bound by the restrictive
judicial attitude toward service of process statutes where, as in the prin-
cipal case, the one hundred mile extension of service of process author-
ized by Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
apply.7
The court cited Robertson v. Railroad Labor Unions and United
States v. RhoadesO as support for the proposition that the explicit limits
of service of process statutes have been judicially guarded. These cases
should not have been persuasive because the judicial attitude toward
service of process and personal jurisdiction has demonstrably changed
since those decisions were handed down. In both Robertson and
Rhoades, the court had held that they would not impliedly extend a
federal service of process statute to allow extra-territorial service
which would have given the federal court in personam jurisdiction.
The Court in Robertson, following prior case law,"0 concluded that
Congress, in setting up judicial districts, intended to enact the common
law which had generally limited in personam jurisdiction to the territo-
rial boundaries of the forum court. Since 1925, when Robertson was
5 The conflicting cases are cited in 236 F. Supp. at 803-04. See, in addition, Wilensky
v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705 (D. Mass. 1964) (in accord with
the principal case).8 236 F. Supp. at 804.7 FFMU.L R. Civ. P. 4(f). This rule, as amended in 1963, provides that "persons who
are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 13(h) or Rule 14, or as additional parties...
pursuant to Rule 19, may be served... at all places outside the state but within the
United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is
commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial. ...
8 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
9 14 F.R.D. 373 (D. Colo. 1953).
14 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ; Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 600 (No.
11,133) (C.C.D. Mass. 1827).
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decided, the limits of the in personam jurisdiction of courts have been
defined by the constitutional notions of fundamental fairness," rather
than by arbitrarily drawn territorial boundaries. State legislatures and
courts have taken advantage of this new power over non-residents. 2
Further, Congress has given the Supreme Court power to draft proce-
dural rules for federal courts. 3 Personal jurisdiction over state claims
in a federal court is, by rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
normally determined by the laws of the state in which the court sits."
Since the power to create liberal procedural rules has been expressly
given to the judiciary, it would appear that the federal courts need not
deem themselves bound by the impractical and outmoded formalistic
approach taken in Robertson.
In the principal case, sound policy considerations suggest that the
court should have implied personal jurisdiction over the defendant with
respect to the pendent state claims.' 5 Development of the doctrine of
pendent subject matter jurisdiction was based upon practical conven-
ience and judicial economy. 6 Where the evidence necessary to a fed-
eral claim is the same or substantially the same evidence necessary
to a state claim, and the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant with respect to the federal claim, the interests of all are
served by deciding the whole case at one time. Court congestion and
piecemeal litigation is avoided, and expense to parties, as well as to
taxpayers, is reduced. Plaintiff's inconvenience in having to present
virtually the same evidence in a new trial in another court, perhaps
three thousand miles distant, would seem to outweigh any inconven-
ience defendant might experience in having to defend both state and
federal claims in the same suit. In the principal case, the court stated:
We are not persuaded by these reasons because we do not agree that
quashing the service of process... will necessarily require relitigation in
another court of the same issues which will have been litigated in this
court. Since the same questions of fact between the same parties are
" E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12 See, e.g., WASH. Rav. CoDE § 4.28.185 (1959); Northern Supply, Inc. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 397 P2d 1013 (Alaska 1965).
13 Judicial Code and Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
"4 However, where state and federal law differ as to the mode of service, federal law
controls. Hanna v. Plumer, 85 Sup. Ct 1136 (1965).
15 See Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 981-82 (S.D.N.Y 1964);
Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of CizLo Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 HARv.
L. REV. 601, 634 n.138 (1964); Note, 73 HARv. L_ REV. 1164, 1175-78 (1960).
x6 See concurring opinion of Chief Judge Magruder, Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d
427, 433 (1st Cir. 1949).
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involved, collateral estoppel should make a mere formality of a separate
suit on the pendent claims.17
It is true that the doctrine of collateral estoppel presently operates
to "preclude relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in
the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of
action as the second suit."" It is possible that the doctrine would
apply in the principal case, but it is suggested that the court's reliance
on it in this case is inappropriate. Indeed, the basic policy behind the
doctrine of collateral estoppel is the same as that of pendent jurisdic-
tion-judicial economy. By requiring plaintiff to institute a totally
new suit the court in the principal case severely detracts from achieving
that fundamental goal. Under the court's theory, plaintiff must com-
mence a new trial, and at least be prepared to argue the merits. -The
costs in time and money to courts, parties, witnesses, and taxpayers
under such a procedure is inconsistent with sound judicial policy. A
plaintiff should not have to rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel
when his claims are truly pendent. To hold otherwise severely limits
the entire doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
17 236 F. Supp. at 805.is Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1945). See EHREN-
zWEiG, CoNimcTs oF LAWS 226-32 (1962).
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